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ABSTRACT: Platform labour is a new phenomenon that brings new forms of labour control with it. The ar-
ticle looks at crowdwork and analyses the various types of control inherent in this phenomenon. It is ar-
gued that crowdwork is not controlled by technological instruments alone, such as algorithms. Indeed, the 
method of organising labour is a complementary control element. Analytically, a technological and an or-
ganisational fix can be distinguished. Their specific characteristics are empirically investigated on the basis 
of crowdwork platforms covering the entire spectrum of qualifications. The result is that already existing 
asymmetries between capital and labour are intensified by the interaction between the technological and 
the organisational fix. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Algorithms have become omnipresent in the recent past. Even though they have 
taken on all kinds of different management duties, the focus on and the critique of 
them in labour-related contexts is necessary yet remains insufficient. The article argues 
that in addition to the technological fix focused on algorithms, an organisational fix 
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represents the complementary flipside of the coin. Both sides and their interaction can 
be analysed, using crowdwork as an example. 
The tendency to narrow down the argument to technology criticism is not new. The 
zenith of Taylorism criticism, for example, went hand in hand with Taylorism’s heyday. 
However, this was accompanied by a double deficiency. First, even though Braverman 
writes that “Taylorism dominates the world of production” (1974, 87) and Sohn-Rethel 
designates it as “the dominant form of the capitalist labour process” (1970, 155), Tay-
lorism was by no means the predominant principle of labour organisation in the West-
ern world. It was rarely realised in its pure form, such that its discursive impact was 
bigger than its practical influence (Drury 1915). Second, research also overestimates 
the capability of the phenomenon (Edwards 1979), and with the establishment of criti-
cism, the belief in the potential of technology was adopted at the same time. Yet, this 
technological determinism was a central element of the criticised subject. With the al-
gorithmically organised and controlled platform labour, the story seems to repeat it-
self. This new form of digitally mediated linking of labour and capital is spreading glob-
ally at a high rate of growth. However, this comes with the danger of adopting the 
technological determinism of start-ups, platforms and internet companies. 
Evgeny Morozov aptly describes Silicon Valley’s philosophy by lending it the term 
'solutionism'. This is an "intellectual pathology that recognises problems as problems 
based on just one criterion: whether they are ‘solvable’ with a nice and clean techno-
logical solution at our disposal“ (Morozov, 2013). Following this, the current critical dis-
course on platform labour in particular and technological control of labour in general 
can be identified as a reversed solutionism. According to Morozov and with a slight and 
decisive change, one could say, that “what's contentious, then, is not their proposed 
solution [critique] but their very definition of the problem itself“ (Morozov 2014, 6). If 
technology only is identified as the central controlling and therefore dubious element, 
significant other aspects are possibly being neglected. By following the technological 
determinism of the apologists for the digitalisation of labour, one runs the risk of be-
coming mechanistic and focusing only on one side of the phenomenon. 
Therefore, the general research question of the article asks how the labour process 
of crowdwork is controlled by the mediating platforms. In particular, the questions of 
the importance of organisational instruments and how they relate to technological 
forms of control are investigated. 
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2. Crowdwork – The liquefaction of labour 
 
The term crowdsourcing as coined by Jeff Howe (2006) refers to a process by which 
an organisation or individuals receive a service or good from a potentially broad group 
of providers. The mediation does not necessarily require the use of the internet, so 
that the term also applies to earlier processes.1  More recently, however, the concept 
has experienced rapid development and steady growth due to the proliferation of 
computers and the internet. Its variety is huge and there is an equally wide spectrum of 
terms to describe the phenomena. Focusing on labour, this article uses the concept of 
crowdwork. This is “defined broadly as paid work managed via online platforms” (Huws 
et al. 2016, 1). Specifically, this refers to goods and services that companies use via 
platforms and integrate into their value creation process. Thus, the focus is first and 
foremost on the mediation, coordination, management and control of practices, which 
are mostly sought by companies via online platforms and usually offered by self-
employed workers. 
Even with such a limitation, the observed phenomenon is extremely heterogeneous 
and in constant evolution (Howcroft and Bergvall-Kåreborn 2018; Huws et al. 2016). A 
helpful further differentiation is the subdivision according to the either local or remote 
nature of labour. The form of labour and the way in which it is controlled differs de-
pending on whether its execution is bound to a specific location or whether it can be 
provided via internet from any place on earth. In addition, different forms of 
crowdwork can be differentiated depending on the qualification level of the labour. 
The spectrum ranges from simple local services or small online tasks to locally un-
bound, creative and knowledge labour. This article focuses on remote crowdwork 
across the entire spectrum of qualifications. This type of labour, its platforms and its 
tasks are steadily increasing and spreading globally (Lehdonvirta 2017). 
Crowdwork started in the field of microtasks, for which it does not require any spe-
cial qualifications (Bergvall-Kåreborn and Howcroft 2014; Lehdonvirta and Ernkvist 
2011). In order to accomplish these numerous and low-paid tasks reliably, it is neces-
sary to break down complex activities and larger projects into individual subtasks 
(Malone et al. 2011): „[B]reaking labour into little units, or modules, is one of the hall-
marks of crowdsourcing” (Howe 2008, 49). This standardisation, modularisation and 
codification has always been a key requirement for outsourcing in general (Huws and 
Dahlmann 2009). However, in addition to this large field of microtasks, crowdwork is 
now increasingly used for complex jobs that require high qualifications, often team-
 
1
 For example, the first Oxford English Dictionary was created in 1884 using the "crowd". 
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work and usually creative and innovative solutions, such as in software development, 
design or marketing. 
For companies, the benefits of this loose and liquid coupling of labour are obvious. 
With the help of crowdwork they can become flexible in terms of function and num-
bers by spontaneously claiming many different workforces (Felstiner 2011). Thus, they 
"transform fixed costs into variable ones“ (Muehlberger 2005, 3) and exploit geograph-
ical differences in qualifications and wages (Graham et al. 2017; Lehdonvirta 2016). For 
the workers, this is associated with the promise of new income opportunities, the abil-
ity to determine working hours flexibly and independently, and in general to be one's 
own boss. There are, however, questions over the extent to which the flexibility and 
self-determination gained can be used by workers in the face of low pay and the con-
tinuing need to maintain one’s individual status on these platforms (Schörpf et al. 
2017). In many cases, similar to general outsourcing practices, crowdwork is more a 
form of 'insecurity-and-risk transfer chains’ (Frade and Darmon 2005). Since the work-
ers are no longer part of the companies, but independent contractors, numerous la-
bour protection laws no longer apply to them as a result of the "independent contrac-
tor loophole“ (Hill 2015, 3). Thus, crowdwork is also referred to as an escape from la-
bour law by means of which also regularly employed workers are displaced (Erickson 
and Sørensen 2016). The beneficiaries of these arrangements state that there is no 
need for further regulation of crowdwork, with warnings that: "Crowd-working and 
crowd-sourcing are new forms of freely organised activity and free cooperation in the 
internet which cannot be captured in law. Neither are these forms of employment that 
can be regulated in any way" (BDA 2015, 5). 
Data on the prevalence of platform labour are rare and diverse. In Germany, for ex-
ample, 12% of the population perform paid labour organised via platforms (Huws et al. 
2016, 23). However, another survey found that only 0.9% of the population do such 
work (Bonin and Rinne 2017). The difference may be explained by the fact that the lat-
ter survey was carried out by telephone and not via Internet and that follow-up ques-
tions were used to check whether the work was actually platform labour. Regardless of 
this, crowdwork is not so much relevant because of its size, but primarily because of its 
new form of organisation. Crowdwork platforms are an organisational avant-garde that 
face specific questions of coordination and control of labour that may in the future also 
concern other organizations. 
For instance, the delegation of business activities to external self-employed workers 
brings the risk of a loss of intra-organisational information (Trompette et al. 2008) 
whilst, at the same time the use of external labour markets highlights the risk of plan-
ning insecurity (Lasecki et al. 2014). Especially relevant is the challenge to control 
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crowdwork because it is linked to the companies only via intermediary platforms (Lei-
meister et al. 2009; Zhao and Zhu 2014). As a result, this gives rise to classical questions 
of controlling the labour process and its results, both for higher skilled labour and mi-
crotasks. The classic answers are limited. Digitalisation is a central enabling condition 
of crowdwork and its dissemination. However, this effectively means that workers do 
not operate on the company premises like temporary workers, but are distributed 
globally, such that the labour process is not directly observable. At the same time, the 
temporary commitment to the company does not allow the creation of traditional 
forms of employee loyalty. 
 
 
3. Controlling Platform Labour via Technological and Organisational Fixes 
 
Coordination and control of labour is not a new challenge for organisations. Howev-
er, the new technologies that enable crowdwork in the first place and allow labour to 
be divided into microtasks, distributed across the globe, are also a central tool for con-
trolling these forms of labour. Technological control is, therefore, a genuine feature of 
platform labour. However, these technologies are not the sole central control element 
- even though this is often advocated. This technological control is complemented by 
the organisational element as the flipside of the same coin. In order to frame this thesis 
theoretically, David Harvey's concept of the (spatial) fix is set forth below - his "proba-
bly most successful as well as most misunderstood term" (Belina 2011, 242). For the 
analysis, the extension of this approach by Beverly Silver is considered, allowing a dif-
ferentiation between technological and organisational fixes. 
David Harvey follows Marx on the assumption that in capitalism overaccumulation 
occurs regularly. Markets are flooded with goods and capital without finding buyers. 
The result is a massive devaluation of capital and economic crises that can affect other 
social fields. However, overaccumulation is in many cases a phenomenon that is locat-
ed regionally or in individual subfields. According to Harvey, these crises can be de-
layed by shifting capital into other economic cycles, such as real estate (Harvey 2001, 
59; 1982, 235). Economic crises are thus prevented by geographical relocation, expan-
sion and restructuring. However, such a reversal of a crisis is only a delay and, there-
fore, never permanent. It reproduces the capitalist contradictions elsewhere in greater 
intensity: "There is, in short, no spatial fix that can contain the contradictions of capi-
talism in the long run" (Harvey 1982, 442). 
Thus, the emergence of platform economies as a result of the global financial crisis is 
no coincidence - Uber as the archetype of platform labour was established in 2009 and 
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also many of the crowdwork platforms were established in the aftermath of the finan-
cial crisis. The technological innovations that enable the standardisation, modularisa-
tion and codification of labour are not the necessary conditions of development. Of 
equal importance are large amounts of capital, which went in search of investment op-
portunities as a result of the financial crisis and thus form the financial basis of these 
platforms. Thus, they correspond to Harvey's fix as a "crisis-induced creation of new 
spatial configurations through the spatial redistribution of capital and jobs" (Wissen 
and Naumann 2008, 395). Even today, many of the platforms are not profitable and 
continue to rely on continued capital inflows. Hence, venture capital continues to be 
the financial basis of their day-to-day business and their intense expansionary aspira-
tions. 
The "creative destruction" in the form of an outstanding product innovation is thus 
far less the core of the phenomenon, which leads to possible "[s]pectacular prizes” 
(Schumpeter 1942, 73) for the platforms. Instead, the hoped-for profits are based on 
the loss-making, stamina and “turning off” of competition with the proclaimed goal of 
monopolising, because “competition is for losers” (Thiel 2014). In doing so, this venture 
capitalists' bet on high future profits generated by the platform companies extends the 
payback period. Following Harvey, it can be assumed that this prolonged commitment 
of capital will only delay the next crisis. The result of investment is increasing produc-
tivity of labour, which in turn leads to a new overaccumulation and extensive capital 
devaluation (Harvey 1982, 219). 
In her analysis of the development of globally distributed labour disputes, Beverly 
Silver (2003) expands and specifies the concept of the fix in order to highlight the ques-
tion of control of labour and its change. She shines a light on the question of how com-
panies are trying to solve not only profitability crises but also to gain control of labour 
via capital transfers. Capital is therefore not only moved in situations of overaccumula-
tion, but also if its profitability resulting from increasing resistance brings with it either 
stronger control efforts or concessions to the workers. On the capital side, there are 
many more options for action than relocation alone. Based on Harvey's spatial fix, she 
differentiates between "product", "financial" and "technological" fix (2003, 39). As a 
result of profitability and control crises, companies not only relocate their production 
sites to other locations. Indeed, the evasive movement may lead to new product lines 
or even industries, or a widespread withdrawal from production and an investment in 
the international financial markets instead. Moreover, according to Silver (2003, 39), 
adversities in the production process may also be encountered by means of new tech-
nological and organisational instruments. 
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Crowdwork comprises all fixes addressed by Silver - but as an interaction of several 
stakeholders. Capital owners are looking for investment opportunities on the interna-
tional market, which they usually channel into venture capital funds to invest in plat-
form companies (financial fix). Their central selling point is the new product of frag-
menting, distributing and merging labour, which also creates new spatial configura-
tions (product fix). In turn, the platforms themselves make intensive reference to pro-
cess innovations in order to coordinate the various stakeholders and, in particular, to 
coordinate and control labour (technological fix). Only the interplay of the various as-
pects makes up the production model of the platform economies and their specific dy-
namics. In the following, the focus is on the technological fix. 
The ambiguity of the English term leaves room for confusion. On the one hand, 
"technological fix" signifies an established term, which refers to the practice of solving 
(social) problems by technological means. At the same time, "technology" stands for a 
technique or a method. Silver uses the term in a double sense. For example, the term 
refers to technical innovations such as ring spinning machines, which replaced mule 
spinning machines in the late 19th century, resulting in rationalisation and at the same 
time the regaining of control over labour by companies (Silver 2003, 87). On the other 
hand, Silver describes "post-Fordist organisational transformations" (2003, 66) by Jap-
anese automakers and the associated proliferation of new organisational methods 
such as lean management (Silver 2003, 66–69). Thus, two very different processes, the 
use of new technological innovations on the one hand and the application of specific 
organisational arrangements on the other, are conceived under the same concept. Ac-
cordingly, both technical and organisational components are inherent in the term 
"technological fix", which is why Silver refers to a "technological/organisational fix" 
several times (Silver 2003, 76, 81, 131, 134, 159, 163). In terms of control of labour, 
technology and organisation are two sides of the same coin. Both are complementary 
and interwoven in social practices, but can analytically be separated and characterised 
by different specifics and dynamics. This implicit but often unclear assumption of Sil-
ver’s work is at the focus of the following analysis of crowdwork control. It distin-
guishes itself from previous analyses of platform economies, which usually focus on the 
technological components only and disregard organisational aspects.  
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4. Subject of investigation and methods 
 
Subjects of the study were four different crowdwork platforms. They were selected 
based on theoretical sampling with the aim of developing object-related theoretical 
concepts (Glaser and Strauss 1967). For this purpose, crowdwork platforms covering 
the entire spectrum were included in the sample. The essential criterion for selecting 
the platforms was the workers’ required qualification. Since lower skilled work involves 
other control mechanisms than higher qualified ones, different references to the tech-
nological and the organisational fix were expected. Accordingly, two of the platforms 
are in the field of microtasks and two are for higher qualified workers. 
The first category includes Amazon's Mechanical Turk platform. It has existed since 
2005, making it the oldest of its kind. Its origins lie in the challenge of identifying dupli-
cation in Amazon's product catalogue. This is a simple activity that cannot be solved by 
artificial intelligence. Therefore, Mechanical Turk called the service "artificial artificial 
intelligence" and Amazon's CEO described it as "humans-as-a-service". Customers are 
promised access to a "global, on-demand, 24x7 workforce". In terms of content, the 
human intelligence tasks offered on this platform are, for example, the marking of pho-
tos, transcriptions or participation in polls. As a rule, only the successfully completed 
task is rewarded. The height of pay for these subdivided tasks is usually in the cent 
range. The second platform Figure Eight (formerly CrowdFlower) is similar in terms of 
structure, content and target group and refers to their services as "human-in-the-loop" 
in which also the non-automatable aspects of artificial intelligence are taken over by 
humans. It is the largest English-language platform of its kind. Higher skilled workers 
are mediated by the other two platforms in the sample. With the slogan "hire freelanc-
ers, make things happen", Upwork targets larger projects for independent and mostly 
subject-specific experts. As the largest crowdwork platform for highly qualified work-
ers, it reported 14 million users in 2017. In comparison, Jovoto, the fourth platform in 
the sample, is much smaller with just under 90,000 users. According to Jovoto, its focus 
is not on quantity but on quality of the workers in the field of “Design, Art and Market-
ing”. Its “talent pool“ can be entered only with a highly rated portfolio, showcasing the 
workers’ skills and experience. With the help of its pools of “creative professionals”, 
the platform promises to accelerate the innovation cycles of companies. 
All platforms are the most relevant and largest in their field, with the exception of 
Jovoto, which exemplifies mostly smaller and highly skilled work-focused platforms. In 
all of these companies, the platforms through which requester and crowdworker inter-
act are central. These interactions are exclusively mediatised as a face-to-interface re-
lationship. The platforms act as intermediaries that centrally shape the labour rela-
Partecipazione e conflitto, 12(3) 2019: 640-664, DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v12i3p640 
  
648 
 
tions. Any company strategy is reflected in the way the platforms are programmed. It 
is, above all, necessary to research the design of these platforms, for which the imme-
diate experience is particularly suitable. Interviews with platform workers are useful as 
a common research method for analysing their lives and subjective experiences. How-
ever, this approach to the phenomenon is insufficient for two reasons. First of all, in-
terviews are not just a stimulus but also an intervention that detaches the interviewee 
from the very same practice that is the focus of the study (Burawoy 1998, S. 14). Thus, 
only retrospective abstract content, of which the interviewees are aware, can actually 
be queried. Second, digital artefacts enter the equation through the technological me-
diation and control of the labour relations. And these are not available for interviews. 
Because of this, the sample was examined ethnographically. An ethnographic approach 
is not uncommon in the sociology of labour, but it is applied here to the analysis of the 
mediating digital artefacts and ecosystems. Focus was not on participant observation 
but on observing participation (Parkin 2017; Wacquant 2006). Crowdwork was carried 
out in the form of virtual self-ethnography (Crang and Cook 2007; Hine 2000) with the 
medium itself and how it controls the labour process as the subject of investigation. In 
this way, the app and its coordination and control of labour were examined. Thus, a 
nuanced first-hand understanding of the labour process was acquired. At the same 
time, the functions of the app could be explored by means of targeted stimuli using “a 
sequence of experiments that continue until one's theory is in sync with the world one 
studies” (Burawoy 1998, 17–18). In dealing with the specific subject of research, such 
an approach allows specifically the platforms’ "infrastructures of participation" (Beer 
2013) to be explored and tested by means of testing hypotheses via interventions. 
The survey period was from August to October 2018. Accounts were created on all 
four platforms and various tasks were completed, during which the coordination and 
control of the labour process was explored and recorded. Following the criterion of 
theoretical saturation, the individual surveys were completed as soon as no new 
knowledge could be gained, so that a ‘conceptual representativeness’ was achieved 
(Saunders et al. 2018). The result was a comprehensive documentation of the labour 
processes in the form of field notes and screenshots. These were analysed according to 
the criteria of computer-aided qualitative content analysis (Kuckartz 2016). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Heiner Heyland, Reversed Solutionism 
 
649 
 
5. Findings 
 
As discussed above, the control of platform labour can be analytically differentiated 
into two aspects, technology and organisation. The following examines the investigated 
platforms with regard to the technological and the organisational fix. 
 
The Technological Fix 
 
Technology is at the same time a central enabling condition of crowdwork and an in-
strument for "the watchfulness of management” (Taylor 1911, 85). Technologies are 
primarily used in administrative areas and in the monitoring of the labour process. 
Classically, these tasks would otherwise be consigned to middle and lower manage-
ment. Computational and algorithmic systems are well placed to map this kind of rou-
tine order-allocation, labour-process-monitoring and outcome-control decisions. In ad-
dition, this approach allows many more variables to be taken into account in decision-
making as well as governance and, according to companies' hopes, make labour pro-
cesses more effective and efficient. Any fundamental changes made by the higher lev-
els of management need not be communicated as per the usual channels, but are 
simply programmed into the software. 
Such algorithmic management refers to the pursuit of entrepreneurial activities – in 
this case especially the organisation and control of labour processes – through the ap-
plication of technological innovations based on automated algorithmic decision-
making. In this way, it is possible for companies to organise a large number of diverse 
workers and to make numerous different decisions directly and automatically (Heiland 
2018; Lee et al. 2015). In the case of crowdwork, this relatively new practice allows di-
rect control over self-employed and globally dispersed workers. Thus, a platform can 
continue to exercise control over workers who are only loosely linked and market-
bound to the companies. The platform workers, on the other hand, are free to offer 
their labour on a case by case basis and yet are closely bound to the way they perform 
their labour. 
Direct technological control instruments are keyloggers that record the workers’ 
keystrokes. Upwork uses time sheet applications that are used to record the working 
time and take screenshots of the crowdworker's desktop randomly within ten minute 
segments.2  The requester can see the workers’ ”activity meter” that shows the num-
 
2
 Only those workers who use this feature can use Upworks’ payment guarantee. Otherwise they are de-
pendent on the probity of the requester in paying the promised amount on completion of the work. 
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ber of mouse clicks, scroll actions and keystrokes per time segment. With these moni-
toring tools, platforms and contractors can ensure that workers, if they are paid hourly, 
actually spend that time on the assigned task, transforming their labour capacity into 
concrete labour. This is analogous to direct control in classic workplaces and gives the 
workers an "invisible supervisor" (Elliott and Long 2016, 138) or as one worker writes: 
“It feels as if the client is over my shoulder, it's like micromanaging“ .3 And as a conse-
quence of such a digital panopticon, it can be assumed that the workers develop a 
highly individualised sense of the responsibility of their own employment and its con-
tinuation (Neff 2012, 28). However, in some countries this form of surveillance is pro-
hibited by law. The effectiveness of such regulations is limited in the light of the global 
nature of the labour relations. When used, this form of control is merely quantitative. 
Although Upwork explicitly states that the meaningfulness of the activity meter de-
pends on the type of labour4, it has a powerful impact as an apparent visualisation of 
labour efficiency. For example, during the survey, one company gave a poor rating on 
the grounds that the data of the time tracker app were not good, even though the task 
required only sporadic computer activity. In general, this form of technological control 
is only partially relevant in the case of Upwork, since many jobs are paid as a piece-rate 
wage. Thus, either small amounts for separate tasks or larger sums for the completion 
of entire projects are paid, such that the efficiency of the labour process does not con-
cern the platforms but the crowdworkers. 
Both Figure Eight and Mechanical Turk, on the other hand, use automatic evalua-
tions of the completed tasks to determine the validity of the results. Tasks can be dis-
tributed to three workers. If one of the contractors deviates from the results (for ex-
ample, tagging a picture) of two other workers, her result is automatically classified as 
incorrect and the reward can be denied. At the same time, this review policy called 
“plurality” is used at Upwork to calculate a "confidence score" for the results. 
Generally, however, the technological fix is less expressed in such direct control 
practices (Friedman 1977). Instead, in most cases it is an algocratic control of the la-
bour process, that is, the "rule of the algorithm" or “rule of the code” (Aneesh 2009, 
350). This algocratic system "consists of programming embedded in global software 
platforms that structure possible forms of labour performance. This system enables the 
monitoring of labour through the design of the labour process itself” (Aneesh 2009, 
349). Such an algocratic technological fix thus defines “grammars of action” (Agre 
1994). It is therefore less necessary to control the labour process, since a deviation 
 
3
 https://community.upwork.com/t5/Freelancers/Disabling-screenshots/m-
p/119646/highlight/true#M61861 
4
 https://support.upwork.com/hc/en-us/articles/211062278-Review-Your-Freelancer-s-Work-Diary 
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from the given framework is quasi impossible. What used to be the formal rules of the 
organisation becomes inevitable law by programming the software. And such a form of 
corporate governance is especially effective in crowdwork, where all communication 
takes place online and the channels used are based on the platform’s software code. 
For example, if a worker at Mechanical Turk has selected a task, it must be done im-
mediately within the time limit set by the client, as the field notes show: „30 minutes 
are available to complete the task. Sufficient time if you do it immediately. I mark half 
of the pictures and let the time run out. I am automatically removed from the task, the 
labour carried out thus far is not saved and no compensation is paid” (P1: 163). 
The platforms help their clients to put their orders online in the appropriate form. 
For example, Figure Eight customers can upload jobs in the form of a “custom markup 
language” (similar to HTML). The platform then automatically takes over the distribu-
tion of these data rows to individual workers who are assigned a specific task at the 
same time, which they usually only have to do in an unmistakable form. The results are 
thus automatically presented in the necessary form, so that it is difficult to deviate dur-
ing the labour process itself. The results are compared with the replies of other work-
ers using the automatic comparison described above. 
Figure Eight also features an automatic pre-selection of workers. Each job is preced-
ed by a "Quiz Mode" in which interested workers have to answer test questions. From 
the resulting score, the individual’s accuracy is calculated: "If a contributor's accuracy 
falls below a preset threshold, they become ‘untrusted’, their judgment is tainted, and 
they are no longer allowed to participate in that job", as stated in the glossary of the 
platform.5 This was also reflected in the study in which poorly executed “quizzes” even 
with only minor mistakes led to exclusion from the corresponding jobs. 
Central to this algocratic control is that the algorithms are black boxes. There is no 
transparency on the criteria used to make decisions, assign orders or impose sanctions. 
"[C]ompanies are rarely motivated to disclose the underpinning criteria of their algo-
rithms and are sometimes unable to fully explain the results themselves, creating very 
low transparency for those managed by the algorithms” (Möhlmann and Zalmanson 
2017, 5). Demands on the platforms are only successful in exceptional cases, as a re-
quester of Mechanical Turk confirmed: "You can not spend time exchanging e-mail. The 
time you spent looking at the e-mail costs more than what you paid them. This has to 
be on autopilot as an algorithmic system...and integrated with your business process-
es” (Irani 2015, 229–230). 
 
5
 https://success.figure-eight.com/hc/en-us/articles/202703305-Getting-Started-Glossary-of-Terms#unit 
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Jovoto exemplifies the limits of technological control. Due to the specificity of crea-
tive work as well as its own logic and time, the labour process is free of direct control 
by the platform. The technological fix is used solely as part of the automated recording 
of the individual users’ performance, which is listed on their profile pages in the form 
of achievements and karma points (consisting of posted comments and ratings for oth-
er projects, uploaded and winning ideas and joint projects). Algocratic design comes 
into play with regard to the assignment of the projects, for example, when workers can 
only apply for projects according to their previously verified skillset as any others will 
not be displayed. 
In summary, it can be said that the different forms of crowdwork generally have 
three aspects of varying degrees in common: algocratic communication and coordina-
tion mediated solely by the software, the recording of individual performances and in-
formation asymmetries. 
1. Communication between platform and workers is unilateral and top-down 
thanks to the specifications of digital algocratic coding outlined above. The 
respective platform is the central mediator between the requester and the 
workers. Usually, there is no personal contact between workers and plat-
forms. 
2. The individual performance of the platform workers becomes relevant 
when, for instance, further job offers are made algorithmically and are 
based on the number of jobs completed and the evaluations assigned to the 
workers. In addition to the method of recording, the execution of the labour 
is sometimes monitored in detail via surveillance instruments. 
3. The platforms deliberately produce information asymmetries that allow 
them to control the labour process. Usually the workers do not know why 
they are given a job opportunity or not. The workers are therefore unaware 
of the requirements on which the decisions are based. 
However, even the algorithmic and algocratic control of crowdwork does not mean 
that the workers are devoid of agency. Experienced workers are capable of seeing 
through some aspects of the technological system and influencing them in their favour. 
For example, as a crowdworker on Upwork one can use the fact that one of the algo-
rithms displays automatic job offers and recommendations based on previous inputs in 
the corresponding search mask of the platform. In this way, workers can influence and 
optimise the type of jobs they see (Jarrahi and Sutherland 2018, 7). In the survey, it 
was found that it was possible to contact requesters and manipulate the hourly wage 
with their help, as an extract from the field notes shows: “The third requester contact-
ed responds. He says, he is happy to be of assistance and offers to register only one 
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hour than the actual two the task required, without reducing the pay. As a result, my 
hourly rate rises and so does my bargaining position for future assignments" (P3: 65). 
As stated, the technological fix is a central element to controlling the crowdworkers 
and their labour processes which are dispersed in a global space and are only loosely 
linked to the companies and platforms. Algorithmic and algocratic control techniques 
severely restrict the workers’ freedom, but they are not all-encompassing. However, 
deviating from or influencing the technological fix requires experience with the respec-
tive platforms and pronounced digital literacy. At the same time, this highlights that 
sole technological control is not enough. Up to this point, it remains unclear why the 
workers submit to technological control. In addition, the effectiveness of technological 
control decreases with increasing complexity and individuality of labour, such that, for 
example, Jovoto exercises very little control of this kind. Therefore, one needs to look 
at the complementary element of the organisational fix. 
 
The Organisational Fix 
 
The central organisational control tool in crowdwork as well as in many platform 
economies in general are internal markets. In addition to the usual inter-platform 
competition in which different platforms compete for market share, capital and labour, 
crowdwork platforms create a closed intra-platform competition in which the workers 
compete with each other. The platforms themselves act as gatekeepers, which can 
regulate the number of market participants by granting access rights. In addition, and 
with the help of the technological fix, the platforms regulate almost all parameters of 
the internal market. However, this internal market does not serve to negotiate prices, 
as is the case with other platforms (e.g. AirBnB or eBay). Instead, based on the individ-
ual performances that represent the currency in these internal markets, a status is 
generated that opens access to more profitable tasks and projects. Thus, the workers 
in these markets are in competition for the possibility of (good and profitable) labour. 
This type of intra-platform markets acts as an efficient coordination tool since it cre-
ates a marker for the platforms and the requesters, which allows the workforce to be 
differentiated. Thus, markets serve as a complexity reducer in the form of "information 
gathering and shortening" (Luhmann 1988, 233), which cuts transaction costs incurred 
in initiating interactions. These markets act as an organisational fix which is marked by 
an asymmetry that contradicts idealistic assumptions about the constitution of markets 
in neoclassical economic theory. There is no perfect competition. And the purpose of 
these markets is not only the efficient coordination of different stakeholders, but pri-
marily their effective control. By emphasising the performance of crowdworkers, the 
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comparatively free and flexible workers are required to adhere to the criteria defined 
by the platforms and to work efficiently. This organisational fix reduces complexity for 
platforms and companies alone. The workers are faced with being reduced to individu-
al key figures, which often does justice neither to their individual competences nor 
their needs. 
Such a form of control via internal markets is similar in its intention to the "responsi-
ble autonomy" identified by Friedman (1977). It occurs in places where direct control is 
not possible or too expensive. Even though the workers have some freedom to move 
despite the algorithmic and algocratic arrangements, they seldom use it for autono-
mous or even resisting action. However, as with Friedman, the reason for this is not 
that workers are given autonomous opportunities for self-realisation and identification 
with the companies or platforms. Instead, competition with other crowdworkers and 
the concomitant concern over the platform's internal status ensure the individual’s 
need to work. 
At Mechanical Turk, the individual status of the workers does not derive from direct 
assessments by the requester: "Mechanical Turk provides system qualification types 
that keep track of a worker's statistics and attributes" the platform writes in their FAQs 
for requester.6 The acceptance or rejection of the labour carried out is particularly de-
cisive as a parameter for measuring the workers’ performance. Requesters can reject 
finished labour without justification and even block individual workers. Only upon ac-
ceptance of the completed tasks do the workers receive the agreed payment. In the 
process, completed but rejected labour becomes the property of the requester. At the 
same time, rejected tasks degrade the individual approval rating of the workers. This is 
relevant because requesters at Mechanical Turk can define the criteria that determine 
which workers will see the task. Central to this is the approval rating and the number of 
completed tasks - the standard requirement is that workers have a 95% approval rat-
ing. More profitable tasks are therefore usually only displayed to workers with a good 
status. The result of rejected tasks is thus not only unpaid labour, but also a long-term 
worsening of income opportunities, especially with a low total number of completed 
jobs. With persistent rejections of the completed labour the workers’ accounts can be 
deactivated automatically. Two tasks were rejected during the survey at Mechanical 
Turk. One automatically because it deviated from the results of two other workers and 
one directly from the requester. "The third task is rejected by the requester. Even after 
several attempts to contact the requester, no reasons are given for the rejection. But 
 
6
 https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSMechTurk/latest/RequesterUI/ManagingQualificationTypes.html 
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the result is that my approval rating decreases and I can choose between less and less 
profitable ones” (P1: 71). 
At Figure Eight, users can be evaluated by requesters as well as other workers and 
the platform. Especially important are the values automatically generated based on in-
dividual performance. These are: completed tasks, correct or incorrectly answered test 
questions and the "agreement" resulting from the congruence of the workers' answers 
with other contributors. If workers have a low error rate and good ratings, they can 
earn badges that allow access to other tasks. All of these evaluation mechanisms are 
one-sided. Only the requester can rate the contributor, not the other way around. In a 
quantitative survey, only 62% of respondents said these ratings were fair more than 
half the time.7 In comparison to false or unfair ratings by requesters, the workers have 
few options for action although the effects can be far-reaching. Requesters on Figure 
Eight are even authorised to label bad workers negatively, what can have serious con-
sequences, as the field notes show: "I take six jobs and finish them poorly or incom-
pletely. This results in bad reviews. Also, I lose a few of the badges I previously ac-
quired. Without these and with poor status due to the negative evaluations it is almost 
impossible to get acceptable work" (P3: 147). 
For the higher-skilled platforms, Upwork and Jovoto, ratings are not carried out au-
tomatically and the workers' specific profiles are far more important. Accordingly, on 
both platforms, the workers’ profiles are more detailed. For example, workers can pre-
sent work samples, introduce themselves individually and complete a variety of tests to 
prove specific skills and take on specific jobs. The visibility of the results of these tests 
for potential employers is individually adjustable. While Upwork's tests are usually au-
tomated and include, for example, language tests, Jovoto requires work samples based 
on which workers' skills are being evaluated. "My submitted poster design is rejected 
as insufficient. A new one costs me several hours of work and activation for specific de-
sign tasks is delayed by three weeks" (P4: 28). As the field notes show, certification is 
more time-consuming and laborious, which is also due to the higher qualification re-
quirements of the platform’s target group.  
At Upwork, the performance statistics recorded using the technological fix are far 
more sophisticated, allowing workers to "see where they are stacking up against the 
competition and what they need to work on".8 This includes the individual "invitation 
response time", how many people are visiting the profile, how often the workers get 
hired and overall reputation. Especially the latter is of relevance. It is from these val-
ues, according to a non-transparent formula, that the "job success score" is calculated, 
 
7
 http://faircrowd.work/platform/crowdflower/ 
8
 https://support.upwork.com/hc/en-us/articles/211062968-My-Stats 
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which, in turn, is displayed to the requesters and serves as a central criterion of distinc-
tion between the different, often identically qualified workers. Most jobs on Upwork 
require at least a 90% job success score. This is also due to the fact that this value is the 
default setting when creating a job as a requester. As a consequence, especially where 
not many orders have been completed, a few bad reviews automatically prevent fur-
ther job opportunities. In such a case, workers are advised to "go on a job-hunting 
spree to ‘drown out’ bad contracts"9, as the field notes demonstrate too: “After several 
poorly completed assignments and the resulting decreasing reputation, it takes six oth-
er successfully finished jobs with substandard pay to return to an acceptable ‘job suc-
cess score’” (P3: 126). In addition to such visual assessments, clients at Upwork have 
the opportunity to give the workers "private feedback" that the latter cannot actually 
see. Of particular importance here is the question of how likely they would be to rec-
ommend the freelancers to a colleague on a scale of 0 to 10. The value of 9 may al-
ready have a negative impact on the job success score. 
As a platform for creative labour, Jovoto constitutes quite a contrast. Here, internal 
markets are created less to reduce complexity or control the labour process. Instead, 
the allocation of tasks is organised solely by means of a market. Companies acquire the 
opportunity to post "brand challenges" on the platform that allow registered freelanc-
ers to submit ideas and designs. Nonetheless, workers' in-platform status plays a role 
as companies can post private competitions for higher fees, in which only the top ten 
percent of users can participate – with a percentage as a relational criterion, the work-
ers have to engage in status work on a permanent basis. Alternatively, the companies 
can create flexible projects whose participation criteria can be determined individually. 
As shown, intra-platform markets play a relevant role in the coordination and con-
trol of crowdwork. But despite these arrangements, crowdworkers strive to gain au-
tonomous agency. Thus, they sometimes set up requester accounts on the platforms in 
order to get to know the other side and adapt their own strategy accordingly (Jarrahi 
and Sutherland 2018, 5–6). Or they try to break down larger jobs into smaller ones, and 
thus gain multiple ratings instead of just one (Jarrahi and Sutherland 2018, 8). In this 
way, the workers gain knowledge about the otherwise opaque algorithms and algocrat-
ic regulations. They use this digital literacy to act on the platforms autonomously and 
to gain a better position on these markets. Mechanical Turk offers workers no oppor-
tunity to discuss such practices and labour related information in general. Therefore, 
many of the crowdworkers find each other in external online communities, such as in 
Facebook groups, Slack or Reddit forums, as well as Skype and WhatsApp chats – which 
 
9
 https://freelancetowin.com/job-success-score/#jobsuccess8 
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are also available for Figure Eight and Upwork. These forums act as complementary 
parallel communication structures independent from the platforms.  
In order to counterbalance the asymmetry of evaluations in the case of Mechanical 
Turk, scholars have programmed an add-on for internet browsers with the help of 
which requesters can be evaluated, such that difficult and payment averse customers 
can be identified and avoided by the crowdworkers. Such opportunities for communi-
cation, which counteract both the asymmetries and opacities inherent in the platforms, 
are valuable instruments for workers seeking to increase their autonomy. At the same 
time, such instruments are only used by a minority. In a survey, 58% of respondents 
said they were not aware of any such communication channels (Berg, Furrer, Harmon, 
Rani & Silberman 2018, S. 80). 
 
 
6. Discussion 
 
As the findings show, both the technological and the organisational components are 
important for the control of crowdwork. The relevance of the fixes and how they inter-
act with each other depends on the qualification level of the targeted labour. There is a 
continuum in which, on the one hand there are simple microtasks that are subject to 
technological control (Mechanical Turk and Figure Eight). This is expressed by direct au-
tomated and algorithmic management practices as well as indirect algocratic control. 
However, even in these low-skilled forms of labour, the workers are forced into compe-
tition with each other and, by means of the organisational fix, they have to carry out 
their work efficiently in order to acquire a good status. Only by doing so can workers 
gain access to (profitable) job opportunities on the intra-platform markets. 
As a platform for higher-skilled labour, Upwork uses time sheet applications, a direct 
technological control form, which is, however, only applied to tasks that are paid per 
hour – and which do not constitute the majority of jobs on the platform. As the tasks 
are both more demanding and more sophisticated, the individual profile of the workers 
is more important. However, the organisational fix in the form of the workers’ individ-
ual status is very relevant. This is because there is usually fierce competition for work 
assignments, such that the individual "job success score" as an intra-platform status is 
crucial for the distribution of jobs. With higher qualifications the technological control 
decreases whilst its complementary organisational form increases. 
At the other end of the continuum, Jovoto operates as a platform for highly qualified 
labour. Control in the form of the technological fix is used here only to a limited extent. 
Creative work proves to be surveillance-resistant. In addition, the workers’ skills and 
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achievements are particularly individual, such that they can be made to compete with 
each other only partially. Nevertheless, the workers also acquire an intra-platform sta-
tus, which helps the requesters to differentiate between the workforce whilst serving 
as a criterion for workers to access specific profitable assignments. 
In summary, it can be said that simple crowdwork is controlled not only technologi-
cally, but also organisationally. As the level of qualifications rises, the relevance of 
technological control decreases and the importance of organisational control increases. 
An exception is highly qualified and individualised creative work, which is resistant to 
rationalisation and is subject to limited control both technologically and organisational-
ly. 
Technology does not suffice as the only coordination and control instrument. All 
platforms use additional organisational control through internal markets to varying de-
grees. Following Beverly Silver, this organisational fix is closely linked to the platforms’ 
technological infrastructure. The technology enables automated market formation. The 
intra-platform markets are not solely a social phenomenon, emerging from the actions 
of various individuals following their own interests. Instead, they are a coordination 
and control mechanism steered by the use of algorithms and algocratic structures. As 
Polanyi (1944), Fligstein (1996) and more recently Ahrne, Aspers and Brunsson (2015) 
show, markets are not a natural phenomenon but a social, organised and political pro-
cess. In the cases considered here, the organisation of the markets lies solely with the 
platforms, which program each of the crucial parameters unilaterally and in this way 
specify the algocratic corridors of action. Therefore, the technological and organisa-
tional fix go hand in hand and only together do they enable an effective and efficient 
control of digital labour. Both are complementary and only effective together. Work-
ers' labour performance is technologically recorded and translated into the market var-
iables defined by the platforms, creating an individual status. Deviations are automati-
cally made impossible by algocracy or sanctioned by the algorithms. The sanctioning 
power of this technological fix has an impact on individual status beyond the individual 
case. A sanction is thus not limited to a single job, but can also make the acquisition of 
further employment opportunities more difficult or even impossible due to the organi-
sational fix. Crowdworkers not only have to use their labour within technological limits, 
but they are also obliged to carry out status work. In addition, the developed status 
binds the workers to the individual platforms. It creates a barrier to moving to other 
platforms such that multi-homing – that is working on different platforms - becomes a 
limited rational strategy. 
Crowdwork refutes and confirms the findings of labour sociology so far: It turns out 
that even simple service labour has not yet reached the limits of its rationalisation and 
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that there is still scope for subsumption of labour under capital through technological 
and organisational innovations. In part, this applies to the field of creative knowledge 
labour in which crowdwork establishes new forms of control. At the same time, how-
ever, the limits of the rationalisation and controllability of labour are clearly shown 
here. However, this is not only due to the specifics of knowledge and creative labour. In 
general, the difference between the design and the interaction of the control mecha-
nisms does not solely depend on the variables qualification and complexity of the la-
bour, but also on the workers’ market power (Silver 2003; Wright 2000). The platforms 
have an inherent and programmed asymmetry between requester and worker. How-
ever, this asymmetry in general and any rating system, and thus the establishment of 
internal markets where workers are put in competition with each other in particular, 
will only work if there is at least a minimum of workers competing for a limited number 
of job opportunities. When a crowdworker has a specific skill set and is the only pro-
vider in her field, both the technological as well as the organisational fix lose their ef-
fect.  
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
Crowdwork brings new challenges in terms of coordination and control of work. As 
stated, the solutions offered by the platforms are not technology-based alone. The 
technological fix, which is supposed to counteract crises of profitability and control of 
capital, is supplemented by a complementary organisational fix. While technological 
control in crowdwork is exercised via algorithms and algocratic structures, organisa-
tional control is characterised by the construction of intra-platform markets, on which 
crowdworkers compete with each other. The technological fix is therefore by no means 
irrelevant. However, it only acquires its relevance in conjunction with a complementary 
organisational fix that represents the flipside of the coin. The mixing ratio of the two 
strongly depends on the qualification level the platforms expect from the workers. 
While simple labour shows high degrees of technological control, organisational con-
trol is a central element as well. As the level of qualification rises, the amount of tech-
nological control decreases and its organisational form increases, with creative labour 
emerging as a type of work which is largely immune to both types of control. 
By means of the organisational fix, the requesters have a powerful position over the 
crowdworker beyond the current project. In some cases, they are not only able to 
withhold payment in spite of the service provided, but they can make it difficult or 
completely prevent future job opportunities for workers with poor ratings. The already 
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existing asymmetry of power between labour and capital is reinforced by the organisa-
tional fix. The consequence is conformity, anticipatory obedience and unpaid status la-
bour by crowdworkers. 
However, both the extensive disempowerment of workers and their control by 
means of performance-based status are dependent on a low market power of the 
workers. If the reserve army mechanism is not strong and platform workers are in 
short supply, the regulation and control efforts of the platforms have only limited ef-
fects. In particular, if the workers have low market power - either as a result of low 
qualifications or if no meaningful status has been acquired on the platform - the work-
ers are forced to avoid misconduct and contradictions and are limited in the choice of 
jobs offered to them. 
According to Polanyi, the specific form of control of the organisational fix set out 
here clearly falls within the scope of a "market society" where “instead of the economy 
being embedded in social relations, social relations are embedded in the economy" 
(Polanyi 1944, 57). Some describe this supposedly neutral, market-based organisation 
as a fair regulatory and redistributive instrument, as the individually influenceable 
benefit rather than the status determining the situation (Botsman 2015). However, as 
stated, the opposite is the case and evaluations function as an effective control tool 
that reinforces rather than reduces existing asymmetries between capital and labour.  
Some concluding remarks have to be made concerning the limitations and the need 
for further research. The article investigates the control regime of crowdwork directly 
by observing participation. Thereby, the central mechanisms become visible. The sub-
jective experiences of the crowdworker are disregarded, so that the actual effect of the 
different forms of control in the course of employment of the affected persons and 
their lives can deviate. This points to a limit of the findings as well as the need for fur-
ther research. In addition, it would be promising to study other aspects of organisa-
tional arrangements and to explore the interdependencies of technology and organisa-
tion in the workplace control regime of digital work. 
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